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Private Enforcement of Competition Law, The Hidden 
Story Part II: Competition Litigation Settlements In The 
UK, 2008-2012 
Introduction 
The author has undertaken research in recent years to attempt to provide a comprehensive 
account, over various periods, of all competition law litigation in the UK courts, involving the 
application of both EU and UK competition law,
1
 and was also principal Investigator on a 
wider AHRC funded project on competition case-law in the courts of all EU Member States 
between 1999-2012.
2
 The latter revealed interesting data and trends on competition 
litigation in the UK and across the EU. However, it has always been recognised that 
competition law disputes which are made visible by the existence of court judgments, and 
especially ďǇ ĨŝŶĂů ƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝǀĞ ũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚƐ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ŵĞƌŝƚƐ ? ĂƌĞ ůŝŬĞůǇ ƚŽ ďĞ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƚŝƉ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ
ŝĐĞďĞƌŐ ? ?dŚŝƐǁĂƐ ƚŚĞ ƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĞ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƵŶĚĞƌůĂǇĂŶ ĞĂƌůŝĞƌƉƌŽũĞĐƚďǇ ƚŚĞ ĂƵƚŚŽƌ ƚŽĐŽůůĞĐƚ
information on the number and types of competition law settlements which took place 
between 2000 and 2005 in the UK, and sought ƚŽ ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇ ĂŶĚ ŝŶĨŽƌŵ ĂďŽƵƚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŚŝĚĚĞŶ
story ?ŽĨƐĞƚƚůĞŵĞŶƚƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞŝŶƚŚĞh<.3 The limited publicly available information in the UK 
can be contrasted with the USA,
4
 where there is considerably more antitrust litigation, a 
number of aspects of the litigation process have been considered and resolved, and where 
there is also more evidence of antitrust litigation settlement practice and outcomes.
5
 This 
article provides an account of a follow-up research project on competition litigation 
settlements in the UK, in relation to the period 2008-2012, comprising an extensive and 
focused analysis of the data accumulated in relation to the reported settlements during that 
period. Discussion of the project and outcomes will follow a broad introduction to the 
private enforcement background including recent developments and an outline of the wider 
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 ZŽĚŐĞƌ ? ? ‘ŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ>Ăǁ>ŝƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞh<ŽƵƌƚƐ PĂƐƚƵĚǇŽĨĂůůĐĂƐĞƐ ? ? ? ?-  ? ? ? ?- Parts I and 
II  [2009] 2 Global Competition Litigation Review 93-114 and 136- ? ? ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ>ĂǁůŝƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ
in the UK Courts: A study of all cases 2009- ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? )'>Z ? ?- ? ? ?ƐĞĞĂůƐŽD&ƵƌƐĞ ? ‘&ŽůůŽǁ-
ŽŶĐƚŝŽŶƐ ŝŶƚŚĞh< P>ŝƚŝŐĂƚŝŶŐ^ĞĐƚŝŽŶ  ? ?ŽĨƚŚĞŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶĐƚ  ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? )  ? ? ? )ƵƌŽ ?: ?  ? ?-
103. 
2
 B Rodger (ed) Competition Law Comparative Private Enforcement and Collective Redress Across the 
EU (2014 Kluwer Law International). 
3
 ZŽĚŐĞƌ ?   ‘WƌŝǀĂƚĞ ŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ ŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ >Ăǁ ? dŚĞ ,ŝĚĚĞŶ ^ƚŽƌǇ P ŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ >ŝƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ
Settlements in the UK 2000- ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?>Z ? ? ? 
4
 See in particular, R H Lande ĂŶĚ : W ĂǀŝƐ ? /ŶƚĞƌŝŵ ZĞƉŽƌƚ ? EŽǀĞŵďĞƌ  ?  ? ? ? ?  ‘Ŷ ǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ
WƌŝǀĂƚĞ ŶƚŝƚƌƵƐƚ ŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚ P  ? ? ĂƐĞ ^ƚƵĚŝĞƐ ? ? ĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞ Ăƚ
http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/Archives/550.ashx, which analysed a group of 29 successful, large-
scale private antitrust cases. 
5
 Ibid. 
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context of competition litigation settlements context and the potential role for ADR, notably 
mediation, in that context. 
 
Private Enforcement Background 
The competition law enforcement landscape has been changing, albeit slowly, particularly 
since the Commission has sought to encourage private enforcement since the early 1990s, 
partly to enhance the deterrence and effectiveness of EU competition law and alleviate its 
own resource limitations. The Ashurst Report and subsequent Green and White Papers on 
 ‘ĂŵĂŐĞƐ ĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ĨŽƌ ďƌĞĂĐŚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ŶƚŝƚƌƵƐƚ ZƵůĞƐ ? ?6 ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞĚ ƚŚĞ ŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?Ɛ
intention to consider further ways to facilitate private competition law enforcement across 
the EU, to potentially allow for a new wave of litigation  following the 2002 Leniency notice.
7
 
In relation to consumer redress, the 2013 Commission Communication
8
 and 
Recommendation on Collective Redress,
9
 recommended that Member States should have 
collective redress mechanisms in place to ensure effective access to justice. However, the 
Recommendation endorses harmonisation at the lowest common level as in general these 
collective redress mechanisms should be based on the opt-in model, with exceptional resort 
to an opt-out model justified on the basis of the sound administration of justice.
10
 More 
recently, in June 2013, the Commission also proposed a Draft Directive to harmonise 
aspects of private litigation across the EU.
11
 The Antitrust Damages Directive, adopted by 
the co-decision procedure in Spring of 2014,
12
 contains provisions aimed at facilitating the 
task of potential claimants in proving their competition law claims, yet probably the most 
controversial provision in that Directive seeks to ensure the protection of leniency 
ĂƉƉůŝĐĂŶƚƐ ? ĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ĨƌŽŵ ďĞŝŶŐ ĂĐĐĞƐƐĞĚ ďǇ ĚĂŵĂŐĞƐ ĐůĂŝŵĂŶƚƐ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ĐŽƵƌƚ
disclosure processes.
13
  
In the UK context, in addition to ongoing developments under EU law,
14
 the new system of 
UK competition law heralded by the Competition Act 1998 with the introduction of a 
modern EU-modelled prohibition system, was underpinned by the intention that the 
Chapter 1 and Chapter II prohibitions (equivalent to Article 101 and 102) would be enforced 
by private party litigants before the courts. The Enterprise Act 2002 subsequently made 
provision inter alia for follow-on actions before a specialist Competition Appeal Tribunal 
                                                            
6
 ƐŚƵƌƐƚ ‘^ƚƵĚǇŽŶƚŚĞĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐŽĨĐůĂŝŵƐĨŽƌĂŵĂŐĞƐŝŶĐĂƐĞŽĨ/ŶĨƌŝŶŐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ
ZƵůĞƐ ? ?  ? ?st August 2004, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/index.html.  
7
 &ŽƌĂĚĞƚĂŝůĞĚĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚŝƐŝƐƐƵĞ ?ƐĞĞZŝůĞǇ ? ‘ĞǇŽŶĚ>ĞŶŝĞŶĐǇ PŶŚĂŶĐŝŶŐŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚŝŶ
ŶƚŝƚƌƵƐƚ>Ăǁ ? ? ? ? ?tŽƌůĚŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? )ƉƉ ? ? ?-400.
8
 Communication, Strasbourg, 11.6.2013 COM(2013) 401 final. 
9
 Commission Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on common principles for injunctive and 
compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights 
granted under Union Law OJ L 201, 26.7.2013, pp. 60ʹ65. 
10
 Commission Recommendation supra n9 at para 21. 
11
 Z'ĂŵďůĞ ‘tŚĞƚŚĞƌŶĞĂƉŽƌ^ƉƌŝŶŐ ?ƚŚĞƚŝĚĞƚƵƌŶƐĨŽƌƉƌŝǀĂƚĞĞŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚ PdŚĞhƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůĨŽƌĂ
ŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞŽŶĂŵĂŐĞƐĞǆĂŵŝŶĞĚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? )>Z ? ? ?-620. 
12
 Directive 2014/104/EU (2014) OJ L349/1. ^ĞĞĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?&tĞŝĚƚ ‘dŚĞŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞŽŶĂĐƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌ
ĂŶƚŝƚƌƵƐƚĚĂŵĂŐĞƐĂĨƚĞƌƉĂƐƐŝŶŐƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶWĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? )>Z ? ? ?-444
13
  ^ŝŶŐŚ ?  ‘ŝƐĐůŽƐƵƌĞ ŽĨ >ĞŶŝĞŶĐǇ ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ P ĞǆĂŵŝŶŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞ ŽŶ ĚĂŵĂŐĞƐ ĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ
aftermath of recent :ƌƵůŝŶŐƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? )'>Z ? ? ?-213. 
14
 See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/index.html. 
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 ? ‘d ? ) ?Moreover, empirical research by the author has demonstrated a slow but significant 
increase in the rate of cases over the last 40 years.
15
 There has been an increase in case-law 
judgments, and anecdotal evidence is that there had been a considerable increase in private 
litigation over the past ten years, with the majority of cases settling,
16
 and considerable on-
going litigation in the High Court in relation to a number of major international cartels.
17
  
More recently, the award of over £33k (plus interest) in lost profit, and perhaps more 
significantly, an additional award of £60k for exemplary damages in 2 Travel Group PLC (in 
Liquidation) v Cardiff City Transport Services Ltd
18
 was the first successful, final award of 
damages by the CAT. That was followed by a subsequent £1.6m damages award in March 
2013 in Albion Water v Dwr Cymru Cyfyngedig.
19
 There is some evidence, of a recent 
increase in the number of claims being raised before the CAT, and it has delivered some 
important judgments to date, although to date these have tended to be procedural 
skirmishes related to time-bar, costs and jurisdiction.
20
 Furthermore, the consumer 
representative claim provision in s47B of the 1998 Act is clearly not an appropriate 
ŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵ ƚŽ ŝŶĐĞŶƚŝǀŝƐĞ  ‘ĐůĂƐƐ ĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?  /ƚ ŵĂǇ ďĞ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽĨŝůĞ ĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ
successful damages awards in 2 Travel Group PLC (in Liquidation) v Cardiff City Transport 
Services Ltd and Albion Water v Dwr Cymru Cyfyngedig may increase awareness of the 
possibility to seek redress for aggrieved parties, and thereby encourage follow-on claims, 
particularly before the CAT.  
Moreover, in 2012 the Department for Business, Innovation anĚ ^ŬŝůůƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ h<  ? ‘/^ ? )
consulted on proposals to reinforce the system of private enforcement in the UK established 
by the Competition Act 1998 and Enterprise Act 2002, and this led to important provision in 
the Consumer Rights Bill to significantly change the landscape of private enforcement in the 
UK.
21
  There are important litigation strategy reasons why follow-on claims are not (and 
increasingly unlikely to be) raised before the CAT, thereby creating a footprint that can be 
tracked, and parties can always raise any competition law actions before the High Court. 
                                                            
15
 Not just in the UK, but EU wide, see B Rodger (ed) Competition Law Comparative Private 
Enforcement and Collective Redress Across the EU (2014 Kluwer Law International).- The findings of 
the research reported in this book show that there is considerably more private enforcement of 
competition law than had previously been imagined, that enforcement is far wider than just actions 
for damages, and that the context in which competition law is most invoked is business to business 
 ? ? )ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?^ĞĞĨŽƌŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞ^ ?WĞǇĞƌ ? ‘DǇƚŚƐĂŶĚhŶƚŽů ^ƚŽƌŝĞƐ W Private Antitrust Enforcement 
ŝŶ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? )Journal of Competition Law and Economics. See also F DĂƌĐŽƐ ‘ŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶůĂǁ
private litigation in the Spanish courts (1999- ? ? ? ? ) ? 
G.C.L.R. 2013, 6(4), 167-208. 
16
 ^ĞĞZŽĚŐĞƌ ? ‘WƌŝǀĂƚĞŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ>Ăǁ ?dŚĞ,ŝĚĚĞŶ^ƚŽƌǇ PŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ>ŝƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ
Settlements in the UK 2000- ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?>Z ? ? ? 
17
 ZŽĚŐĞƌ ‘tŚǇŶŽƚĐŽƵƌƚ ?ƐƚƵĚǇŽĨĨŽůůŽǁ-ŽŶĂĐƚŝŽŶƐŝŶƚŚĞh< ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ):ŽƵƌŶĂůŽĨŶƚŝƚƌƵƐƚ
Enforcement 104-131. 
18
 2 Travel Group PLC (in Liquidation) v Cardiff City Transport Services Ltd  [2012] CAT 19. See C 
sĞůũĂŶŽǀƐŬŝ ‘dǁĂƌĚƐdƌŝƉůĞĂŵĂŐĞs, Well Not Really- Cardiff Bus, and the Dislocation between 
>ŝĂďŝůŝƚǇĂŶĚĂŵĂŐĞƐĨŽƌǆĐůƵƐŝŽŶĂƌǇďƵƐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?>Z  ? ?-49. 
19
 [2013] CAT 6. 
20
 ^ĞĞWŬŵĂŶ ? ‘WĞƌŝŽĚŽĨůŝŵŝƚĂƚŝŽŶƐŝŶĨŽůůŽǁ-on competition cases: when does a  “decision ? 
become final? ? (2014) 2 (2) Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 389-421  
21
 See https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/private-actions-in-competition-law-a-
consultation-on-options-for-reform and https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/consumer-
rights-bill. 
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Accordingly, a central aim of the reforms was to enhance the role of the specialist court, the 
CAT by extending its competence to hear stand-alone actions as well as follow-on actions, 
and allow parties to seek injunctions as well as monetary awards.22 The key proposal by BIS, 
at least in the context of collective redress, was to recommend the adoption of an opt-out 
representative collective action for consumers and businesses (in follow-on and stand-alone 
claims),23 together with mechanisms for CAT approved collective settlements. Furthermore, 
there were proposals to introduce an innovative scheme to enable the competition 
authorities to certify a voluntary redress scheme.24 Each of these BIS recommendations was 
included in reforms to be made to the existing Competition Act regime, originally by clause 
82 and Schedule 7 of the Consumer Rights Bill, when the Bill was first introduced to 
Parliament on 23
rd
 January 2014. The Act was given Royal Assent on 26 March 2015 and the 
changes to the Competition Act 1998 regime, introduced by section 81 and Schedule 8 to 
the 2015 Act, come into effect on a date appointed by statutory instrument. As indicated 
above, the Act contains provision to enable the CMA to certify a voluntary redress scheme, 
and one prominent academic commentator believes that this innovation may be more 
important in practice than reliance simply on a private enforcement model.25  
 
Settlements and Mediation Context 
 The reality is that the overwhelming majority of private disputes, including 
competition/antitrust disputes,
26
 settle out of court before a final judgment on the merits,
27
 
                                                            
22
 These key changes to the role and competence of the CAT following the passing of the Consumer 
Rights Act 2015 have been addressed by A ŶĚƌĞĂŶŐĞůŝ ?  ‘dŚĞ ŚĂŶŐŝŶŐ ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ ŽĨ ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ
enforcement in the UK: The Competition Appeal Tribunal between present challenges and an 
ƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ ĨƵƚƵƌĞ ?  ? ? ? ? ? )  ? ? ? ) :  ?-30. Note that the power to award injunctions only relates to 
proceedings before the Tribunal in England and Wales and Northern Ireland, and an interdict is not 
available in relation to Scottish proceedings. 
23
 ^ĞĞ  ‘WƌŝǀĂƚĞ ĐƚŝŽŶƐ ŝŶ ŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ >Ăǁ P  ĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂƚŝŽŶ ŽŶ ŽƉƚŝŽŶƐ ĨŽƌ ƌĞĨŽƌŵ- government 
ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ? :ĂŶ  ? ? ? ? ĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞ Ăƚ
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/70185/13-501-
private-actions-in-competition-law-a-consultation-on-options-for-reform-government-
response1.pdf at paras 5.11-5.23. 
24
 Ibid at paras. 6.20-6.26. 
25
  See C Hodges  ‘Fast, Effective and Low Cost Redress: How Do Public and Private Enforcement and 
ADR Compare? , Ch 8 in Rodger (ed) 2014 supra. 
26
 ^ĞĞ ? ?ZĞŶĨƌĞǁ ? ‘EĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ:ƵĚŝĐŝĂů^ĐƌƵƚŝŶǇŽĨ^ĞƚƚůĞŵĞŶƚƐŝŶŝǀŝůĂŶĚƌŝŵŝŶĂůŶƚŝƚƌƵƐƚ
ĂƐĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?F.R.D. 495 at pp.495-496:-  “ ?ŽĨƚĞŶŽǀĞƌůŽŽŬĞĚĂŶĚƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐŝŐŶŽƌĞĚĨĂĐƚƐŽĨ life 
in litigation is that the overwhelming number of cases are disposed of by various means prior to trial. 
&ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ƉĞƌĐĞŶƚŽĨĂůůĨĞĚĞƌĂůĐŝǀŝůĐĂƐĞƐǁĞƌĞĚŝƐƉŽƐĞĚŽĨƉƌŝŽƌƚŽƚƌŝĂů ?ŶƚŝƚƌƵƐƚ
cases are not significantly different in this respect: 90 per cent of all private treble-damage actions 
ǁĞƌĞĚŝƐƉŽƐĞĚŽĨƉƌŝŽƌƚŽƚƌŝĂů ? ?
27
 ^ĞĞ: ?ůĞǆĂŶĚĞƌ ? ‘ŽƚŚĞDĞƌŝƚƐDĂƚƚĞƌ ?^ƚƵĚǇŽĨ^ĞƚƚůĞŵĞŶƚƐŝŶ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚŝĞƐůĂƐƐĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ? ? ?-
1991 43 Stan. L. Rev. 497 at p.498:-  “ ?ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚƌŝĂůŝƐour paradigm of how civil litigation resolves 
disputes, in reality only a tiny fraction of litigation cases  W perhaps five percent or less  W are actually 
ƚƌŝĞĚƚŽũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚ ?DŽƐƚĐĂƐĞƐĂƌĞƌĞƐŽůǀĞĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƐĞƚƚůĞŵĞŶƚ ? ?
For a consideration of some statistics in relation to England and Wales, see Smith, Bailey and Gunn 
on Modern English Legal System, 4
th
 edn, S.H. Smith, J.P.L. Ching and M.J. Gunn (eds), (London:Sweet 
and Maxwell, 2004) at pp677-679. See also the Lord WoolĨZĞƉŽƌƚ ‘ĐĐĞƐƐƚŽ:ƵƐƚŝĐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ
earlier Pearson Committee Report (1978, Cmnd 7064, which noted that 86% of cases settled without 
proceedings).  
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although it is difficult to provide any accurate figures for this where we consider settlements 
at all phases after the dispute has arisen, irrespective of whether an action has been raised 
in the relevant courts.
28
 The current research has not sought to develop a particular model 
of why cases settle,
29
 which cases settle
30
 and what factors help to determine settlement,
31
 
but on the basis of the limited sample of reported settlements it does allow us to identify 
trends and factors which may be relevant in those contexts, and it is generally accepted that 
settlements should be promoted.
32
  
ADR, and notably mediation, involving independent expertise may facilitate in dealing with 
complexities associated with competition litigation, such as causation, quantum and 
                                                            
28
 : ?D ?WĞƌůŽĨĨ ? ?> ?ZƵďŝŶĨĞůĚ ?ĂŶĚW ?ZƵĚĚ ? ‘ŶƚŝƚƌƵƐƚ^ĞƚƚůĞŵĞŶƚƐĂŶĚdƌŝĂůKƵƚĐŽŵĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? )dŚĞ
Review of Economics and Statistics 401, note in relation to their empirical study at p404:-  “ĞĐĂƵƐĞ
ƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞŶƵŵĞƌŽƵƐƉĂƚŚƐƚŚĂƚĂĐĂƐĞĐĂŶĨŽůůŽǁ ?ƚŚĞĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝǌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂĐĂƐĞĂƐŚĂǀŝŶŐ “ƐĞƚƚůĞĚ ?
ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶďĞĞŶ “ĚƌŽƉƉĞĚ ?ŝƐĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚƚŽŵĂŬĞ ?tĞůĂďĞůĂƐ Ă “ƐĞƚƚůĞŵĞŶƚ ?ĐĂƐĞƐƚŚĂƚĐůŽƐĞĚĚƵĞƚŽ
a pretrial stipulation and order, pretrial withdrawal, settlement, or that were statistically 
ĐůŽƐĞĚ ?&ŝŶĂůůǇ ?ǁĞĚƌŽƉƉĞĚĂĐĂƐĞŝĨ ?ŝŶƚŚĞŽƉŝŶŝŽŶŽĨ ƚŚĞƉĂƌĂůĞŐĂůǁŚŽĐŽůůĞĐƚĞĚƚŚĞĚĂƚĂ ?ĂŶƚŝƚƌƵƐƚ
was not a sŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚŝƐƐƵĞŝŶƚŚĞĐĂƐĞ ? ? 
29
 Cf J. M. Perloff, D. L. Rubinfeld, and P. Rudd supra, at p401:-  “tŚĞƚŚĞƌƉĂƌƚŝĞƐƚŽƉƌŝǀĂƚĞĂŶƚŝƚƌƵƐƚ
lawsuits settle or go to trial depends on their beliefs about the likely trial outcome and on their 
attitudes toward riƐŬ ?Ŷ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ĨĞĂƚƵƌĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŵŽĚĞů ŝƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ůŝŬĞůŝŚŽŽĚ ŽĨ ƐĞƚƚůĞŵĞŶƚ
ĚĞƉĞŶĚƐŽŶƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ďĞůŝĞĨƐĂďŽƵƚƚƌŝĂůŽƵƚĐŽŵĞƐ ?^ƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇ ?ƐĞƚƚůĞŵĞŶƚƐĂƌĞĂĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ
ĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚĚŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶŽĨŽƵƚĐŽŵĞƐĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůŽŶƚŚĞĐĂƐĞŐŽŝŶŐƚŽƚƌŝĂů ? ? 
30
 See ĨŽƌŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞ> ?>ĞĚĞƌŵĂŶ ? ‘tŚŝĐŚĂƐĞƐ'ŽdŽdƌŝĂů ?ŶŵƉŝƌŝĐĂů^ƚƵĚǇŽĨWƌĞĚŝĐƚŽƌƐŽĨ&ĂŝůƵƌĞ
dŽ ^ĞƚƚůĞ ?  ? ? ? ? ? )  ? ? ĂƐĞ t ? ZĞƐ ? > ? ZĞǀ ?  ? ? ? Ăƚ ƉƉ ? ? ? ?-  ? ? P  “DĂŶǇ ƐĐŚŽůĂƌƐ ŚĂǀĞ ƚŚĞŽƌŝǌĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ
cases that go to trial are not representative of the larger pool of disputes. If tried cases are 
substantively different from the much larger set of cases that settle prior to trial, then published 
ĐĂƐĞƐůĂǁƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐŽŶůǇĂĚŝƐƚŽƌƚĞĚǁŝŶĚŽǁŝŶƚŽƉĞŽƉůĞƐ ?ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƌŝŶƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽůĞŐĂůƌƵůĞƐ ?ƵŶůĞƐƐ
we determine the mecŚĂŶŝƐŵƐ ďǇ ǁŚŝĐŚ ĐĂƐĞƐ ĂƌĞ  “ƐĞůĞĐƚĞĚ ? ĨŽƌ ƚƌŝĂů ? ? ůŝƚƚůĞ ĞŵƉŝƌŝĐĂů ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ
ĞǆŝƐƚƐĂďŽƵƚǁŚĂƚĨĂĐƚŽƌƐŝŵƉĂĐƚŽŶĂĐĂƐĞ ?ƐůŝŬĞůŝŚŽŽĚŽĨŐŽŝŶŐƚŽƚƌŝĂů ? ?
31
 L.J White (ed) Private Antitrust Litigation (MIT Press, 1988), at pp. 164-166:-  “tĞŚǇƉŽƚŚĞƐŝǌĞƚŚĂƚ
the settlement gap is a function of the characteristics of the case and the litigants as well as 
ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞŝŶƚŚĞĐŽƵƌƚƐ ?&ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ŽŶĞŵŝŐŚƚĞǆƉĞĐƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƐŝǌĞŽĨƚŚĞŵĂƌŬĞƚ  ?ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ?
national, regional, or local) firm size, industry or other litigant characteristics, and the relationship 
between the parties (competitor, supplier, customer etc) would be important indicators of the 
ƉƌŽƉĞŶƐŝƚǇƚŽƐĞƚƚůĞ ? ?^ĞĞĂůƐŽ: ?D ?WĞƌůŽĨĨ ? ?> ?ZƵďŝŶĨĞůĚ ?ĂŶĚW ?ZƵĚĚƐƵƉƌĂ ?ĂƚƉ ? ? ? P-  “ŝĨĂĐůĂƐƐ
action is requested, the probability of settlement falls by nearly 44 percentage points. The reason is 
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƉůĂŝŶƚŝĨĨƐŝŶĂĐůĂƐƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐƵŝƚŚĂǀĞĂ ? ?A?ůŽǁĞƌƉƌŽďĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨǁŝŶŶŝŶŐĂƚƚƌŝĂů ? ?ĐŚĂŶŐĞƐŝŶ
rules on discovery or other changes that affect the probability that a plaintiff will win at trial may 
substantially affect the share of cases that settle, and hence the burden on the court system. 
Moreover, because the size of the risk aversion effect increases with the size of damages awarded, 
trebling antitrust damages has a dramatic effect on the probability of a settlement. Were we to stop 
ƚƌĞďůŝŶŐĂŶƚŝƚƌƵƐƚĚĂŵĂŐĞƐ ?ƚŚĞĨƌĂĐƚŝŽŶŽĨĐĂƐĞƐůŝƚŝŐĂƚĞĚǁŽƵůĚŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂůůǇ ? ?^ĞĞĂůƐŽ' ?
D&ŽƵƌŶŝĞƌĂŶĚd ?t ?ƵĞŚůŬĞ ‘>ŝƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ^ĞƚƚůĞŵĞŶƚŶŵƉŝƌŝĐĂůƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?dŚĞZĞǀŝĞǁ
of Economics and Statistics Vol. LXXI Number 2 189 at p189:-  “dŚŝƐ ůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞ ĨŝŶĚƐ ƚŚĞƐĞƚƚůĞŵĞŶƚ
choices of expected utility maximizing litigants to be dependent upon their risk preferences, their 
expectations regarding which party will prevail if a trial occurs, and their expectations about the 
amount of money to be awarded by the court in the event the plaintiff wins. Alternative rules for 
assignment of legal expenses are also shown to influence the relative frequency of settlements. 
While the importance of these variable in theoretical models of settlement choice is clear, their 
ĞŵƉŝƌŝĐĂůƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶĐĞŚĂƐŶŽƚǇĞƚďĞĞŶǀĞƌŝĨŝĞĚ ? ?^ĞĞĂůƐŽ: ?ůĞǆĂŶĚĞƌƐƵƉƌĂ ?
32
 See also Hodges n 25 supra. 
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distribution issues, in an attempt to reach a negotiated solution between parties.
33
 As 
,ŽĚŐĞƐ ŚĂƐ ŶŽƚĞĚ P  ‘^ǇƐƚĞŵƐ ĂƌĞ ƐƉƌĞĂĚŝŶŐ ƋƵŝĐŬůǇ ĂĐƌŽƐƐ ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ DĞŵďĞƌ ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ĨŽƌ
consumer ADR (CDR), based on an architecture of ombudsmen or other special bodies 
rather than courts, since it is a swift, cheap and effective means of resolving consumer-to-
ďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ ? ? )ĚŝƐƉƵƚĞƐ ? ?34 and CDR must now be available for every type of C2B dispute.35 
/Ŷ ŝƚƐ /^  ? ? ? ? ŽŶƐƵůƚĂƚŝŽŶ ĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚ ? ƚŚĞ 'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ŶŽƚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ  “ĐĂƐĞƐ ďĞŝŶŐ ƌĞƐŽůǀĞĚ
through alternative means, avoiding court involvement, can be a more satisfactory outcome 
ĨŽƌĂůůƉĂƌƚŝĞƐĂƐǁĞůůĂƐƌĞĚƵĐŝŶŐďƵƌĚĞŶƐŽŶƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞ ? ?/ƚ ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ŝƐŵŝŶĚĞĚƚŽĞŶƐƵƌĞ
that courts and the OFT can use ADR wherever suitable, and to encourage private and third 
ƐĞĐƚŽƌďŽĚŝĞƐƚŽƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĨƵƌƚŚĞƌĨŽƌŵƐŽĨZ ? ? ?36 Although there is no mention of ADR or 
settlements in either the Commission 2013 Recommendation on Collective Redress or the 
2014 Antitrust Damages Directive the Consumer Rights Act 2015 contains provision for a 
collective redress settlement scheme,
37
 and also for a certified voluntary redress scheme 
without adopting any specific measures in relation to ADR. Hodges considers that although 
ADR may assist settlement, the decision on whether to settle remains primarily an economic 
decision and the pressures and incentives to litigate early do not exist as clearly as they do 
in the USA. Ideally, Hodges considers that a combination of voluntary redress and ADR 
would comprise the best technique for enhancing the quality of private enforcement 
redress but that in essence this needs to be incentivized by other aspects of the way the 
enforcement system were designed.
38
 Partly reflecting the academic debate on the role for 
ADR mechanisms in dispute resolution generally and anecdotal evidence about the 
increasing role for mediation in competition litigation settlements, the research undertaken 
here also sought to ascertain the extent to which mediation has been a factor in 
competition settlements in the relevant period.  
 
Undertaking the research 
It was necessary to define the research period which was confined to the period between 
2008-2012 inclusive, as the research commenced during the late Summer of 2013. The 
earlier research on this topic had covered the period 2000-2005 and it would have been 
                                                            
33
 See K.J. Hopt and F. Steffek (eds.), Mediation: Principles and Regulation in Comparative 
Perspective (Oxford University Press, 2012). 
34
 Hodges, Ch 8 in Rodger 2014 supra n25 at p263. See also C. Hodges, I. Benöhr and N. Creutzfeldt-
Banda, Consumer ADR in Europe (Hart Publishing, 2012).  
35
 Directive 2013/11/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on alternative dispute 
resolution for consumer disputes and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 
2009/22/EC (Directive on consumer ADR); and Regulation (EU) No 524/2013 on online dispute 
resolution for consumer disputes (Regulation on consumer ODR). 
36
 Consultation, ch 6 Introductory summary. 
37
 S 49A and s49B of the revised Competition Act 1998. The Netherlands invented a mechanism for 
making a settlement scheme binding on inactive class members, under the Class Action Settlement 
Law (WCAM) C. Hodges, The Reform of Class and Representative Actions in European Legal Systems: 
A New Framework for Collective Redress in Europe (Hart Publishing, 2008), p 70ff. F. Weber and W.H. 
van Boom,  ‘ƵƚĐŚdƌĞĂƚ PdŚĞƵƚĐŚŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞ^ĞƚƚůĞŵĞŶƚŽĨDĂƐƐĂŵĂŐĞĐƚ ?tD ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ? ? ? )
1 Contratto e Impresa/Europa, 69-79. 
38
 Comprising a public aspect- such as achieving the resolution of all public sanctions- and private 
compensation consequences at the same time, or the prospect of negotiating a sufficiently large 
reduction the fine or other penalty. This underlies the voluntary redress certification scheme being 
introduced by the Consumer Rights Act.  
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more problematic for the relevant respondents to trace accurate information for the period 
going back to 2006 and this also supported a more limited research timeframe. We sought 
to ensure that the research would target, in as comprehensive a manner as possible, all 
practitioners within the UK legal system who may have been involved in private 
enforcement of either/both EU and UK competition law. The Legal 500 was used to compile 
a database of practitioners most likely to be potentially involved in competition litigation. 
The Legal 500 search tool was used,
39
 with the search focused on EU and Competition law 
within the broader corporate and commercial area. We formed a database of 83 
practitioners to contact, using the leading individuals in London and a practitioner for all law 
ĨŝƌŵƐŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚĂĐƌŽƐƐƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌ ‘ƌĞŐŝŽŶƐ ?ŽĨƚŚĞh<ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?Questionnaires were 
forwarded to the 83 lawyers on 23
rd
 October 2013, although the actual sample of potential 
respondents will have been less than that because we contacted multiple individuals in 
some of the London firms as it was unclear from the Legal 500 database which of those 
practitioners in a firm were more likely to be involved directly in competition litigation as 
opposed to acting in a public enforcement context.
40
 A subsequent reminder with duplicate 
questionnaires was sent to all potential respondents in February 2014. Unlike the earlier 
research none of the questionnaire recipients responded to the effect that they had no 
competition litigation experience or practice, and responses were only received by 
respondents who had actually completed questionnaires. Unfortunately, the initial response 
rate was very poor with a total number of only 12 responses,
41
 with a range of 1 to 5 
completed questionnaires for the relevant period, resulting in 29 completed 
questionnaires
42
 as opposed to 43 for the earlier period 2005-2008 (from 18 respondents). 
A selection of law firms were contacted directly in December 2014 and this resulted in three 
further responses and 16 questionnaires and a total of 45 questionnaires for 2008-2012.
43
 
The number of responses overall was disappointing, and exacerbated by the absence of key 
details in many of the settlement questionnaires regarding levels of settlement awards, 
perhaps reflective of enhanced but misplaced caution by lawyers regarding confidentiality 
and anonymity of individual settlement agreements.
44
 Accordingly, we will assess certain 
                                                            
39
 http://www.legal500.com.  
40
 As noted earlier, the Legal 500 list only identifies lawyers within the broad specialism area of 
EU/competition law. 
41
 Generally, response rates to surveys have declined considerably since the 1960s, as reported by J. 
'ŽǇĚĞƌĂŶĚ: ?DĐ< ?>ĞŝƉĞƌ ‘dŚĞĞĐůŝŶĞŝŶ^ƵƌǀĞǇZĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ P^ŽĐŝĂůsĂůƵĞƐ/ŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŝŶSocial 
Surveys, edited by D. De Vaus (London:Sage Publications, 2002) at pp191-210. For a fuller discussion 
of the issue of response rates, see see V Lehmann Nielsen and C. Parker, Centre for Competition and 
Consumer Policy, The ACCC Enforcement and Compliance Survey: Report of Preliminary Findings 
(2005) http://cccp.anu.edu.au/projects/ 
CCCPReport%20Final.pdf at pp9-12. 
42
 Recipients were requested to complete one questionnaire for each settlement within the sample 
period. 
43
 There were various completed questionnaires for 2013, which unfortunately could not be 
considered as they fell outside the relevant period. 
44
 As explained in my introductory letter, we did not ask for any details which could identify the 
parties involved and indeed the questionnaire information was input to SPSS which provides 
generalised data and allows us to identify trends rather than any concern with individual settlement 
outcomes. The reticence by some respondents continued despite assurances about University 
ethical requirements, the fact that no details of firms involved in settlements was requested which 
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trends we can observe in the reported settlements over the period 2008-2012 but one must 
bear in mind the limited response rate and accordingly it is difficult to demonstrate that this 
is an accurate and complete reflection of all the types of competition litigation and 
settlement activity during the period. 
 
Questionnaire Results and Analysis 
The data on the 45 returned questionnaires was input and analysed using the statistical 
programme, SPSS for windows.
45
 Frequency analysis was carried out on the responses, in 
some cases represented graphically, and crosstabulations were made between certain 
responses.
46
 This has allowed us to provide detailed information about the numbers of 
settlements, the competition law rules relied on in cases, the types of dispute and whether 
mediation was involved, together with a range of other issues identified in the 
questionnaire. The research outcomes provide invaluable insights into litigation and 
settlement practice, and in relation to the more limited sample of settlements (compared to 
the research for 2000-2005) allows us to look in more detail at the relationship between 
different aspects of the settlements, to allow us, where feasible, to build a better picture of 
the types of litigation settlements and the underlying rationale/motivations and outcomes 
in the different settlement contexts.
47
 
 
Number and Period of Settlements 
Q2 asked in which year the settlement took place. Table 1 provides the total number of 
settlements in competition law litigation for each year between 2008-2012. Like the earlier 
research, where there appeared to be a fairly dramatic increase in the number of 
settlements in latter years to 2005, in this period there is a significant increase in reported 
settlements in the final 3 years, particularly 2012. Nonetheless, even although there appears 
to be more settlements in the last 3 years this may simply reflect the fact that those were 
easier to record for the respondent practitioners as the files and individual and institutional 
memory of more recent cases is likely to be higher.  
TABLE 1- Year of Settlement 
 
 Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 2008 4 8.9 8.9 
2009 5 11.1 20.0 
2010 9 20.0 40.0 
2011 10 22.2 62.2 
2012 17 37.8 100.0 
Total 45 100.0  
                                                                                                                                                                                         
would allow them to be identified, and the practical matter that all questionnaires were simply input 
into SPSS to provide aggregated responses for each question. 
45
 SPSS 22. 
46
 See Frances Clegg, Simple Statistics, A course book for the social sciences, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990). 
47
 But note the limitations in this data as discussed further infra. 
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Competition Law Rules Concerned  
Q3 asked which areas of competition law the settlement concerned and provided the 
following options:- a) Article 101; b) Article 102; c) Chapter I prohibition; d) Chapter II 
prohibition; e) Article 101/Chapter I prohibition; f) Article 102/Chapter 2 prohibition; and g) 
other combination of rules. Table 2 provides details of the competition law rules concerned 
in the 29 reported settlements and this is represented graphically in Chart 1. 
Table 2 Competition Law Rules Concerned 
 
 Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 Art. 101 19 42.2 42.2 
Ch. I prohibition 4 8.9 51.1 
Ch. II prohibition 4 8.9 60.0 
Art. 101/Ch. I prohibition 4 8.9 68.9 
Art. 102/Ch. II prohibition 4 8.9 77.8 
Other combination of rules 10 22.2 100.0 
Total 45 100.0  
 
Chart 1 Competition Law Rules Concerned 
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Clearly Article 101 was most frequently resorted to in the settled disputes, and this 
continues a similar trend from 2005-2008. Similarly, the focus in abuse cases is on Chapter II 
although the absence of any Article 102 cases alone is noteworthy.
48
  However, although the 
categories provided in the questionnaire sought to ascertain the reliance by parties on 
specific competition law rules, we can observe a broader picture. Aggregating the anti-
competitive agreements case categories (and we will look in more detail at what types of 
cases these are) provides 27 cases- 60% as opposed to only 8 abuse cases (17.8%) and 10 
combination of rules cases (22.3%).
49
 In the earlier research
50
- Part I Hidden Story- there 
was parity between abuse and anti-competitive agreements cases. The broader picture of 
the types of cases settling should become clearer as we examine the other data and 
crosstabulate the results. 
 
Competition Law Dispute 
Q4 asked which type of competition law dispute the settlement involved and provided the 
following options:- a) Claim for abuse of a dominant position; b) Defence to the exercise of 
an IPR; c) Claim by a direct purchaser from a cartel; d) Claim by an indirect purchaser from a 
cartel; e) Dispute relating to a vertical agreement; f) Defence to enforcement of a contract; 
and g) Other, please specify. The outcomes are set out in Table 3 and Chart 2.   
 
Table 3 Type of Dispute 
 Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 Abuse of dominance claim 7 15.6 15.6 
Cartel direct purchaser claim 26 57.8 73.3 
Other 9 20.0 93.3 
Combination 3 6.7 100.0 
Total 45 100.0  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
48
 There were 5 cases in total involving Article 102- 4 in combination with Chapter II, and one case 
involving all 4 sets of rules. 
49
 2 respondents provided details of these as: all 4 sets of rules (Articles 101 and 102 and Chapter I 
and II), and Article 101 Article 53 EEA. 
50
 Supra n3. 
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Chart 2 Type of Dispute 
 
 
Notably none of the settlements alone involved any of the following:- defence to the exercise of an 
IPR; claim by an indirect purchaser from a cartel or defence to enforcement of a contract.  A 
significant majority of the reported settlements involved cartel direct purchaser claims (57.8%)
51
 and 
7 were abuse of dominance claims (24.1%).This is a significant shift from the earlier research where 
the most frequent response was in relation to a claim for abuse of a dominant position, with 21/43 
(48.8 %). KĨƚŚĞ ‘KƚŚĞƌ ? ?ƐĞƚƚůĞŵĞŶƚĐĂƐĞƐ ?ƚŚĞŵĂjority constituted claims by competitors, primarily 
in relation to cartel activities. 
 
Parties Involved 
Q5 asked about the parties involved in the settlement, and provided the following options:- a) 
Multiple claimants; b) Multiple defendants; c) Both; d) Neither. Table 4 provides details of the 
parties involved in the 45 reported settlements.  
 
 
                                                            
51
 Including all of the final batch of 10 reported settlements, in relation to which unfortunately no 
final settlement value details were provided, as discussed further infra. 
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Table 4 Parties Involved 
 Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 Multiple claimants 2 4.4 4.4 
Multiple defendants 7 15. 20.0 
Both 21 46.7 66.7 
Neither 15 33.3 100.0 
Total 45 100.0  
There were multiple parties in 66.7% of cases, with 21 or 46.7% of cases involving both multiple 
claimants and defendants.  This is a notable development from the earlier research where the vast 
majority of settlements involved individual party litigants- 67.4%-  and only 11.6% both multiple 
claimants and defendants. This is suggestive of a broader change in the type of competition litigation 
being undertaken and settled, but we should understand more when we crosstabulate the data on 
this issue with other variables.  
 
Proceedings Raised Prior to Settlement 
Q 8 asked whether proceedings had been raised prior to settlement?52 Table 5 provides details of 
the answers for the 29 reported settlements. 
 
Table 5 Prior Proceedings Raised 
 Frequency 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 Yes 30 66.7 
No 15 100.0 
Total 45  
 
This question sought to tease out the nature and context of the settlement process in competition 
law cases, and ascertain whether settlements routinely followed litigation. In the majority of 
reported cases settlement followed proceedings being raised- 66.7% (30 of the 45 settlements), 
although there are no further details regarding the stage of litigation at which settlement was 
reached. This is a slight increase from the earlier period, where 51.2% of reported settlements arose 
after commencement of court proceedings, and this may indicate a shift towards the more common 
settlement pattern in US antitrust cases where settlements are frequent, court approved and 
publicised, but often after a very lengthy litigation battle.
53
 
 
Again more interesting insights may be gained when we crosstabulate the data from this question in 
relation to the data in relation to other variables. Unsurprisingly, the responses to question 9 
demonstrated that the vast majority of prior litigation had been raised in the courts of England and 
                                                            
52
 The questionnaire sought information about settlements both after and prior to commencement 
of litigation, and this aspect required to be clarified for various potential respondents. The obvious 
difficulty with including settlements prior to commencement of litigation is where to draw the line.  
53
 See Lande and Davis supra n4. 
13 
 
Wales (32/45, 71.1%) as set out in Table 6.
54
 Nonetheless 4 settlements were reached in relation to 
litigation before the Scottish courts, demonstrating an increasing awareness and likelihood of 
competition law disputes and litigation in that context.
55
  
 
Table 6 Jurisdiction Proceedings Raised 
 Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 England and Wales 32 71.1 71.1 
Scotland 4 8.9 80.0 
N/A 8 17.8 97.8 
CAT 1 2.2 100.0 
Total 29 100.0  
 
The Basis of Settlement 
Q 10 asked respondents to denote the basis of settlement and provided the following options:- a) 
Payment in lieu of Damages; b) Agreement as to Future Conduct; c) A Combination of Both; d) 
Withdrawal of Claim without any of the above; and e) Other, Please specify. Table 7 provides details 
of the basis of settlement in the 45 reported settlements and this is represented graphically in Chart 
3.  
 
 
Table 7 Basis of Settlement 
 Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 Payment in lieu of damages 21 46.7 46.7 
Agreement as to future 
conduct 
7 15.6 62.2 
A combination of both 11 24.4 86.7 
Simple withdrawal of claim 6 13.3 100.0 
Total 45 100.0  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
54
 Although it does appear that this question was answered on the basis of where proceedings 
actually were or could have been raised, given that 24 responses related to proceedings in specific 
legal systems of the UK. 
55
 ^ĞĞĨŽƌŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞZŽĚŐĞƌ ? ‘ŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ>ĂǁŝŶĂ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚ&ŽƌƵŵ ? ? ? ? ? ? ):ƵƌŝĚŝĐĂůReview 247-275. 
It may be that, despite the separate category for CAT, a number of the 32 responses for England and 
Wales may have been in relation to actual or potential CAT proceedings.  
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Chart 3 Basis of Settlement 
 
 
 
This aspect focuses even more specifically than the legal provisions relied upon, or the type of 
dispute on the context in which settlements take place in seeking to ascertain the remedy sought 
which drives the settlement process. Clearly the most common basis of settlement was a payment in 
lieu of damages, in 47.7% of cases (21 of 45).  Agreement as to future conduct cases constituted 7 of 
the cases (15.6%) and 11 cases (24.4%) were a combination of those two modes of settlement. The 
remaining 6 cases settled on the basis of a simple withdrawal of the claim (13.3%). Compared to the 
earlier research, this indicates a significant increase in settled cases on the basis of a payment in lieu 
of damages alone, from 23.3% in the full period 2000-2005.
56  
 
Amount of damages sought and paid 
Q11 asked respondents, where damages were sought, to specify the approximate amount sought in 
total by or from the client, and provided the following options:- a) Under £1m; b) Between £1m and 
                                                            
56
 Although note that in that period, 20.9% of cases comprised the combination of payment in lieu of 
damages with an agreement as to future conduct. Furthermore, as discussed below, there was clear 
evidence in that period that the incidence of payment in lieu of damages cases was increasing to 
2005, a trend continued in the more recent period. 
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£5 m; c) Between £5m and £20m; d) Over £20m; e) N/A.
57
 Table 8 provides details of the answers for 
the 8 reported settlements.  Q12 asked for the approximate amount paid in total by or to your 
client, where damages were paid and, although the response was open rather than a tick-box, the 
responses were classified using similar categories as for question 11:- a) Between £100k and £1m; b) 
Between £1m and £5 m; c) Over £5m d) N/A.  Table 9 provides details of the answers for the 
reported settlements. Unlike the position in the USA,
58
 the only visible information about settlement 
levels in the UK was provided in the earlier study in relation to the period 2000-2005. 
Disappointingly, the data here is limited because a number of respondents refused to provide data 
on amounts sought and paid in settlements due to confidentiality reasons. 
 
Table 8 Amount Sought 
 Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 Under £1m 1 2.2 2.2 
Between £1m and £5m 6 13.3 15.6 
Between £5m and £20m 14 31.1 46.7 
Over £20m 5 11.1 57.8 
N/A 19 42.2 100.0 
Total 45 100.0  
 
Table 9 Amount Paid 
 
 Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 Between £100k and £1m 6 13.3 13.3 
Between £1m and £5m 7 15.6 28.9 
Over £5m 5 11.1 40.0 
N/A 27 60.0 100.0 
Total 45 100.0  
 
Despite the existence of 32 settlements involving payment in lieu of damages, we have only been 
provided with details of damages actually paid in 18 cases,
59
 notwithstanding assurances regarding 
anonymity and confidentiality. There has been a slight decline in the proportion of cases involving 
large damages claims of over £20m, with 5 of 29 (17.2%) compared to 10 of 43 (23.3%) in the earlier 
period. However, compared to the earlier research period, most notable is the increase in 
settlements generally involving sums of over £1million- 12 in total with 7 settlements between £1 
                                                            
57
 The N/A for sums sought obviously relate to claims which were not for damages, and similarly for 
damages paid, where there were no damages paid. However, it was also used predominantly by 
respondents who did not want to provide those settlement details on confidentiality grounds. 
58
 See for instance Lande and Davis, supra n4. 
59
 Although this is if anything a slight improvement compared to the earlier research period where 
we were provided with details of 9 settlements in 19 payment in lieu of damages cases. 
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and £5m
60
 and 5 settlements of over £5m, compared to only 4 £1m plus settlements (out of a similar 
sample of 43) in the earlier period.
61
  The highest reported settlement in the earlier period was 
ƐƚŝƉƵůĂƚĞĚĂƐ  ‘ďĞƚween £5- ? ?ŵ ?ďƵƚ ƚŚĞŚŝŐŚĞƐƚ ƌeported settlement between 2008 and 2012 was 
£16m.
62 
Settlement Motivations  
Q14 asked what were perceived to be the motivations behind settlement in the particular dispute, 
and provided the following options, allowing more than one option to be selected for any dispute:- 
a) To avoid the uncertainty of litigation; b) To avoid creating damaging legal precedent; c) To reduce 
the likely damages; d) To reduce the likely costs inconvenience; e) To smooth ongoing business 
relationships; f) Other, please specify. The responses are set out in Table 10. 
 
Table 10 Settlement Motivations 
 
 Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 Avoid Uncertainty of Litigation 3 6.7 6.7 
Reduce Likely Damages 2 4.4 11.1 
Reduce Likely costs/inconvenience 1 2.2 13.3 
Smooth Ongoing Business 
Relationships 
1 2.2 15.6 
Other 5 11.1 26.7 
A combination of Factors 33 73.3 100.0 
Total 45 100.0  
 
Respondents could tick more than one box and unsurprisingly a considerable number of 
respondents ticked multiple boxes- 17 of the 29 (58.6%) fell within this combination of factors 
category. This limits the potential for crosstabulating the results with other data. Nonetheless it does 
indicate that there are normally multiple overlapping rationales for parties settling disputes in a 
competition law context.
63
 Looking at the combination of factors responses reveals that a 
considerable majority of responses,  33 (73.3%)
64
 considered avoiding the uncertainty of litigation as 
a motivation for settlement.  A slightly lower figure of 55.8% cited this as a motivation behind 
settlement in the earlier period, and it is perhaps concerning that the legal landscape in the 
subsequent years has not provided any greater certainty as to litigation outcomes in this context.  In 
declining order, the other factors were reduce likely costs/inconvenience (30, 66.7%); reduce likely 
damages (14, 31.1%); smooth ongoing business relationships (14, 31.1%).
65
 Of the 5 respondents 
                                                            
60
 The highest of the reported settlements in this band was £3.5m. 
61
 Only one reported settlement in the earlier period of over £5 m. 
62
 Although note as stated above, a significant number of respondents did not provide details of the 
settlement figures where there had been a payment in lieu of damages. 
63
 hŶĨŽƌƚƵŶĂƚĞůǇƚŚĞŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐŝŶƚŚŝƐ ‘ĐŽŵďŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ĨĂĐƚŽƌƐ ?ŵĂŬĞƐĂŶǇĐƌŽƐƐtabulation 
between the data here and data in relation to other issues of very limited significance and will not be 
undertaken for the purposes of this article. 
64
 Including the 3 respondents who selected this motivating factor alone. 
65
 This has clearly become a less significant factor compared to the earlier research period, perhaps 
reflecting the higher incidence of Article 101 payment in lieu of damages based settlements as 
evidenced above compared to the reported settlements between 2000-2005.  
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who ticked Other, two specified the following motivations for settlement:-  ‘ƉƌĞƐƵŵĞĚ ůĂĐŬ ŽĨ
ƉƌŽƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨƐƵĐĐĞƐƐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘K&dŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŽĐĂƌƚĞůĨŽƵŶĚƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐŶŽĐĂƌƚĞů ? ? 
 
Type of Claim 
Obviously one of the most significant issues in looking at the development of competition litigation 
is the dichotomy between follow-on and stand-alone actions, and Q 15 of the questionnaire asked 
whether the settlement related to a follow-on or stand-alone claim. Follow-ŽŶ ĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ  ‘ĨŽůůŽǁ-ŽŶ ?
from prior public authority enforcement decisions, for example, where a damages action is raised 
against a party or parties who against whom there has been a Commission cartel infringement 
decision based on Article 101 TFEU. Cartel-related damages actions are nearly always follow-on 
actions, facilitated by a provision in Regulation 1/2003 which makes prior Commission infringement 
decisions binding subsequently on national courts.
66
 There are similar provisions in many Member 
States in relation to the evidential value or binding nature of prior infringement decisions by their 
NCAs,
67
 and this has been supplemented by Article 9 of the 2014 Antitrust Damages Directive.
68
 
Stand-alone actions are independent of, and, usually, in the absence of enforcement action by a 
competition authority. This would arise either because the competition authority will not deal with a 
complaint in accordance with its prioritisation principles, or because the victim needs to take 
immediate court action to bring a halt to the alleged anti-competitive behaviour. Stand-alone 
actions tend to be associated with allegations based on the abuse of a dominant position under Art 
102 TFEU. The distinction between follow-on and stand-alone cases can become somewhat blurred. 
In the UK, litigation preceded by a CMA decision may be raised in the normal courts outside the 
designated follow-on mechanism. TŚĞ ƚĞƌŵ  ‘ĨŽůůŽǁ-ŽŶ ?can be used in a narrow sense to refer to 
actions raised against parties named in infringement decisions by the relevant authorities. But in 
other cases the defendants are not directly named in the infringement decision, but are related 
companies, perhaps the parent company in a corporate group. In a wider sense these could be seen 
as follow-on claims, but because the defendants are not the specific addressees of the decision they 
could also be seen as stand-alone claims.
69
  
 In recent work undertaken by Rodger,
70
 albeit based on a completely different methodology for 
counting competition law private enforcement cases, it was observed that the frequency of stand-
alone and follow-on actions varied considerably across the EU Member States in the study period of 
1 May 1999 and 1 May 2012. In relation to the aggregate EU case-law (excluding Germany), stand-
alone actions dominated, representing 85.3% of the total, with only 14.7% of judgments relating to 
follow-on actions.
71
  In the UK, the figure for follow-on cases in that study was considerably higher 
than the EU average at 36.8% of the overall UK case-law, although not all of these judgments will 
have been delivered as part of the specific follow-on mechanism under s47 of the 1998 Act (by the 
CAT or subsequent appeal courts). This current research demonstrates an even more significant role 
for follow-on actions, at least in terms of the limited reported settlement activity on which the study 
is based, with 73.3% of settlements involved in follow-on cases and only 26.7% in stand-alone cases 
as set out in Table 11 and Chart 4.  
                                                            
66
 Article 16 of Regulation 1/2003. 
67
 See for example in the UK under its follow-on mechanism, but see above re the changes 
introduced by the Consumer Rights Act and see in particular Andreangeli supra n22. 
68
 Directive 2014/104/EU (2014) OJ L349/ ? ?^ĞĞĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?&tĞŝĚƚ ‘dŚĞŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞŽŶĂĐƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌ
ĂŶƚŝƚƌƵƐƚĚĂŵĂŐĞƐĂĨƚĞƌƉĂƐƐŝŶŐƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶWĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? )>Z ? ? ?-444
69
 See for instance Cooper Tire & Rubber Co v Shell Chemicals UK Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 864, CA. See 
also more recently, Nokia Corporation v AU Optonics Corporation and others [2012] EWHC 732 (Ch) 
and Toshiba Carrier UK Ltd and others v KME Yorkshire Ltd and others [2011] EWHC 2665 (Ch). 
70
 B Rodger (ed) Competition Law Comparative Private Enforcement and Collective Redress Across 
the EU (2014 Kluwer Law International). 
71
 See Rodger ibid, Chap. 2.  
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Table 11 Type of Claim 
 Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 Follow-on 33 73.3 73.3 
Stand-alone 12 26.7 100.0 
Total 45 100.0  
 
Chart 4 Type of Claim 
 
 
 
 
Difficulties in Pursuing/Establishing a Case 
Q16 asked what were the principal difficulties in pursuing or establishing the competition law issues, 
and provided the following options, allowing more than one option to be selected for any dispute:- 
a) Evidential; b) Economic; c) Legal Uncertainty; d) Availability of Expertise; e) Publicity; f) Other, 
please specify. The responses are set out in Table 12. 
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Table 12 Difficulties 
 
 Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 Evidential 10 22.2 22.2 
Legal Uncertainty 1 2.2 24.4 
Other 1 2.2 26.7 
A combination of Factors 33 73.3 100.0 
Total 45 100.0  
 
Respondents could tick more than one box and unsurprisingly again the vast majority of respondents 
ticked multiple boxes- 33 of the 45 (73.3%) fell within this combination of factors category- and 
accordingly the responses make it difficult to relate particular cases and types of disputes to specific 
difficulties. Nonetheless it does indicate that there are normally various difficulties faced by parties 
in a competition law dispute.
72
 The most frequent response in the earlier period of 2000-2005 was 
Evidential, in 51.2% of all cases. It is clearly still the most common sole burden or difficulty facing 
competition litigants, with 10 respondents (22.2%) citing this factor alone, and a further 31 
respondents (68.9%) cited this as one of combination of factors. Accordingly evidential difficulties 
were a major difficulty faced in 91.1% of the reported settlements, a significant increase on the 
previous period. This is somewhat difficult to equate with the data suggesting that the majority of 
actions are follow-on actions given the evidential and proof advantages associated with such actions. 
It is suggested that the evidential difficulties may lie primarily in relation to issues of causation and 
quantum although further work would be required to establish this. Legal uncertainty was cited as a 
difficulty in 15 cases overall (33.3%) although strangely not all of the cases match with those where 
the uncertainty of litigation was considered to be a factor motivating settlement (in 33 cases, 
73.3%). Economic difficulties were considered to be the second most significant difficulty with 26 of 
45 responses identifying with this issue (57.8%).
73
  In declining order, the other difficulties faced by 
parties were:- publicity (2, 4.4%); smooth ongoing business relationships (8, 17.8%). 
 
Mediation 
Earlier work by the author
74
 noted the anecdotal evidence of the increasing role of mediation in 
competition-law-related disputes, and suggested that resort to mediation maybe one of the reasons 
considerably fewer disputes are being litigated.
75
 At that stage the UK BIS consultation had proposed 
the promotion of ADR, notably mediation, to resolve competition law disputes, and set out a range 
of consultation questions on how best to encourage the use of ADR in this context.
76
 In this context 
                                                            
72
 hŶĨŽƌƚƵŶĂƚĞůǇƚŚĞŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐŝŶƚŚŝƐ ‘ĐŽŵďŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĨĂĐƚŽƌƐ ?ŵĂŬĞƐĂŶǇĐƌŽƐƐƚĂďƵůĂƚŝŽŶ
between the data here and data in relation to other issues of very limited significance and will not be 
undertaken for the purposes of this article. 
73
 One respondent specifically noted in the questionnaire that:-  ‘The cost of economic research is a 
ŵĂũŽƌŽďƐƚĂĐůĞƚŽƉƌŽƉĞƌĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŝŶĂĨŽůůŽǁŽŶĂĐƚŝŽŶ ? ? 
74
 ZŽĚŐĞƌ ? ‘tŚǇŶŽƚŽƵƌƚ ? A Study of Follow-ŽŶĐƚŝŽŶƐŝŶƚŚĞh< ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ):ŽƵƌŶĂůŽĨŶƚŝƚƌƵƐƚ
Enforcement 104-131. 
75
 This is based on anecdotal evidence and reference in the dismissal of certain cases by the CAT to 
the parties having resolved the matter via mediation. See alsŽ D ŽǀĞƌ ĂŶĚ  >ĞĐĐŚŝ ?  ‘DĞĚŝĂƚŝŶŐ
ŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ>ĂǁĂƐĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ? )ƌďŝƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? W24. 
76
 See BIS Consultation above n20 paras 6.1 W6.25. Nonetheless, there are no specific provisions in 
the Consumer Rights Act 2015. See eg C Hodges, 'Fast, Effective and Low Cost Redress: How do 
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it is appropriate that there should be a better understanding of how the availability of and resort to 
mediation has impacted upon competition law litigation practice to allow a better understanding of 
how competition law rights may be effectively realized. Accordingly the questionnaire sought to 
elicit information on the role mediation may have played in competition litigation settlement 
practice in the period. As discussed above, there has been increasing resort to mediation generally in 
commercial litigation,
77
 and there is anecdotal evidence that it is becoming more common in 
competition litigation disputes. Q 17 asked whether mediation was involved in the settlement and 
the results are set out in Table 13.  Only 5 cases involved mediation
78
 but this constituted 11.1% of 
the reported settlements in the period. Although there are few cases, it will be interesting to seek to 
ascertain the types of case that are more likely to lead to mediated settlements.  
 
Table 13 Mediation Involved 
 
 Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 Yes 5 11.1 11.1 
No 40 88.9 100.0 
Total 45 100.0  
 
Q 18 asked whether in those cases where mediation had been resorted to whether it had been 
viewed as a positive process by you and your clients and why? The following positive anecdotal 
responses were received:-  ‘ǀŝĞǁĞĚĂƐƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞ- ŐŽŽĚƐĞƚƚůĞŵĞŶƚ ĨŝŐƵƌĞ ĨŽƌŽƵƌĐůŝĞŶƚ ? ?ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞĂƐĂ
ŐŽŽĚŽƵƚĐŽŵĞǁĂƐĂĐŚŝĞǀĞĚ ? ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŵĞĚŝĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚĂŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨƚŚĞůĂƌŐĞƐƚĐůĂŝŵĂŶƚƐƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚƚŚĞ
basis to settle the remainder oĨƚŚĞĐůĂŝŵƐ ? ? 
 
Crosstabulated data 
In this section we will seek to crosstabulate many of the variables to give us a fuller picture of the 
types of settlement involved in the 45 reported settlements. This has been explored in greater depth 
than in the earlier study, and accordingly only limited comparisons with the earlier period are 
feasible. Nonetheless, the analysis here is restricted by apparent confidentiality concerns in relation 
to the provision of settlement damages details and also limited by the information revealed by the 
multiple tick-box categories, notably in relation to settlement motivations and difficulties.  
 
 
Competition Law Area  
First we took the area of competition law data and crosstabulated it with the type of dispute data as 
set out in Table 14. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
Public and Private Enforcement and ADR Compare?' Ch 8 in B Rodger (ed), Competition Law: 
Comparative Private Enforcement and Collective Redress Across the EU (Kluwer, 2014). 
77
 See for example, D Spencer and M Brogan, Mediation Law and Practice, CUP, 2012; B Clark, 
Lawyers and Mediation, Springer, 2012. 
78
 One response noted, in relation to Q18 below, that ADR was involved though not mediation. 
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Table 14 Competition Law Area/Type of Dispute 
 
 
 
Type of Dispute 
Total 
Abuse of 
dominance 
claim 
Cartel direct 
purchaser 
claim Other Combination 
 Art. 101 0 15 2 2 19 
Ch. I prohibition 0 2 2 0 4 
Ch. II prohibition 4 0 0 0 4 
Art. 101/Ch. I prohibition 0 2 2 0 4 
Art. 102/Ch. II prohibition 3 0 0 1 4 
Other combination of rules 0 7 3 0 10 
Total 7 26 9 3 45 
 
This provided the inevitable results that the cartel direct purchaser claims all involved Article 
101/Chap 1 and  that the abuse of  dominance claims were all based on Article 102/Chapter 2.  
In crosstabulating the area of competition law with the basis of settlement, as set out in Table 15, 
only 2
79
 of the 21 settlements resolved by a payment in lieu of damages did not involve Art 101/chap 
1 (ie 90.5% of payment cases were anti- competitive agreements cases)  whereas inevitably only 1 of 
the cases resolved by an agreement as to future conduct
80
 did not involve the rules on abuse of 
dominance.
81
 
Table 15 Area of Competition Law/Basis of Settlement 
 
Basis of Settlement 
Total 
Payment in 
lieu of 
damages 
Agreement 
as to future 
conduct 
A 
combination 
of both 
Simple 
withdrawal 
of claim 
Area of Competition Law Art. 101 11 0 6 2 19 
Ch. I prohibition 3 1 0 0 4 
Ch. II prohibition 2 1 0 1 4 
Art. 101/Ch. I 
prohibition 
3 0 0 1 4 
Art. 102/Ch. II 
prohibition 
0 3 1 0 4 
Other combination 
of rules 
2 2 4 2 10 
Total 21 7 11 6 45 
                                                            
79
 Both Competition Act 1998 Chapter 2 cases. 
80
 A Competition Act 1998 Chapter 1 case. 
81
 One involving Chapter 2 alone, 3 involving a combination of chapter 2 and Art 102 and the final 
case involving a wider combination of rules. 
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This reveals, as perhaps anticipated, that payment in lieu of damages settlements tend to occur in 
anti-competitive agreements cases and the future conduct agreement settlements tend to arise 
more frequently in dominance cases.  This is perhaps inevitable, with claimants in abuse cases 
generally more concerned about their future viability and not being excluded from market 
opportunities. It also reinforces the data from the earlier study where 7 of the 11 Article 101 
settlement cases, 63.6%, involved payment in lieu, either alone or in combination with an agreement 
as to future conduct, whereas only 22.2% of the Chapter 2 abuse cases led to some form of 
payment.  
 
Table 16 Type of Dispute/Basis of Settlement 
 
 
Basis of Settlement 
Total 
Payment 
in lieu of 
damages 
Agreement 
as to future 
conduct 
A 
combination 
of both 
Simple 
withdrawal 
of claim 
Type of Dispute Abuse of dominance claim 2 4 0 1 7 
Cartel direct purchaser claim 14 2 9 1 26 
Other 3 1 1 4 9 
Combination 2 0 1 0 3 
Total 21 7 11 6 45 
 
 Indeed, in looking at the type of dispute and basis of settlement crosstabulation in Table 16, of the 6 
abuse of dominance claims which did not lead to a withdrawal of the claim,
82
 4 were settled on the 
basis of an agreement as to future conduct, and 2 on the basis of a payment in lieu of damages, 
whereas of the 25 cartel direct purchaser claims which did not result in a withdrawal of the claim,
83
 
23 were settled by a payment in lieu of damages, alone in 14 cases and combined with an 
agreement as to future conduct in 9 cases,  and only 1 case was settled solely on the basis of an 
agreement as to future conduct. There were also 3 combination cases, 2 of which resulted in 
payment in lieu of damages and 1 in a combination of a payment and agreement as to future 
conduct. 
 
The link between cartel claims under Art 101 and damages based settlements is further highlighted 
when crosstabulating the area of competition law with the amount of damages paid as set out in 
Table 17.  
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 Of which there was one. 
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 Of which there was one. 
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Table 17 Area of Competition Law/Amount of Damages Paid 
 
 
 
Damages Paid 
Total 
Between 
£100k 
and £1m 
Between 
£1m and 
£5m Over £5m N/A 
Area of Competition Law Art. 101 2 2 2 13 19 
Ch. I prohibition 2 2 0 0 4 
Ch. II prohibition 0 1 0 3 4 
Art. 101/Ch. I 
prohibition 
2 0 0 2 4 
Art. 102/Ch. II 
prohibition 
0 0 0 4 4 
Other combination of 
rules 
0 2 3 5 10 
Total 6 7 5 27 45 
 
 
In all the settlements where details were provided of the damages paid, only 1 of those (between 
£1m and £5m) involved the Chapter II prohibition.
84
 4 of the remaining 6 settlements with a 
payment of between £1m and £5m involved reliance on the Article 101 or Chapter I prohibition, with 
the other 2 involving a combination of rules. Moreover, there were two reported settlements 
involving payments of over £5m in disputes based on Article 101,
85
 in addition to three further such 
large settlements involving a combination of rules. 
 
 
In crosstabulating the type of dispute with the parties involved in the dispute as set out in Table 18, 
the most notable issue is that virtually all the cartel direct purchaser claims (24 out of 26, 92.3%) 
involved either or both multiple claimants and defendants, with 18 of those 26 having both multiple 
claimants and defendants (69.2%).  
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 None of these settlements involved Art 102 at all. 
85
 Interestingly, the final batch of 10 submitted reported settlements all involved Article 101 and 
cartel direct purchaser claims but unfortunately no details of damages sought or paid were provided 
with the questionnaires. The link between Article 101/cartels and higher settlement damages 
payments is reinforced by the crosstabulated data in relation to the type of despite and the damages 
paid, which establishes that 8 of the 12 settlements of over £1m involved direct purchaser claims 
alone.  
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Table 18 Type of Dispute/Parties Involved 
 
 
 
Parties involved 
Total 
Multiple 
claimants 
Multiple 
defendants Both Neither 
Type of Dispute Abuse of dominance claim 0 0 0 7 7 
Cartel direct purchaser claim 2 4 18 2 26 
Other 0 3 1 5 9 
Combination 0 0 2 1 3 
Total 1 5 10 13 45 
 
In undertaking the crosstabulations between the data, and bearing in mind the limited scope of the 
study, we can build up a picture of the most common types of competition law dispute, at least 
those which are settled. Cartel litigation tends to involve a multiplicity of litigants, claimants and 
defendants.  It is also notable that all of the 7 abuse of dominance cases involved neither multiple 
claimants nor defendants, again reinforcing the impression that abuse cases are generally direct 
competitor disputes between a dominant undertaking and a single party which has allegedly 
suffered some form of direct abuse or exclusionary strategy. 
 
 
In crosstabulating the type of dispute with the type of claim, as demonstrated in Table 19, 5 of the 7 
abuse of dominance claims were stand-alone actions (71.4%) whereas 24 of the 26 cartel direct 
purchaser claims were follow-on actions (92.3%), confirming the perception that cartel claims tend 
to follow-on from prior infringement proceedings.  
 
Table 19 Type of Dispute/Type of Claim 
 
 
Type of Claim 
Total Follow-on Stand-alone 
Type of Dispute Abuse of dominance claim 2 5 7 
Cartel direct purchaser claim 24 2 26 
Other 5 4 9 
Combination 2 1 3 
Total 33 12 45 
 
 
Given the limited number of mediated outcomes, and the spread of the 5 mediated settlements 
between the different types of dispute, no clear pattern emerges from the data set out in Table 20 
as to the type of dispute in which mediation is more likely. 
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Table 20 Type of Dispute/Mediation Involved 
 Mediation Involved 
Total Yes No 
Type of Dispute Abuse of dominance claim 0 7 7 
Cartel direct purchaser claim 3 23 26 
Other 1 8 9 
Combination 1 2 3 
Total 3 26 45 
 
Parties Involved 
When we crosstabulate the parties involved with damages paid, the notable point is that multiple 
claimants were involved in all five of the £5m plus settlements, as demonstrated by Table 21. 
 
Table 21 Parties Involved/Damages Paid 
 
 
Damages Paid 
Total 
Between 
£100k 
and £1m 
Between 
£1m and 
£5m 
Over 
£5m N/A 
Parties involved Multiple claimants 0 0 2 0 2 
Multiple defendants 4 1 0 2 7 
Both 1 4 3 13 21 
Neither 1 2 0 11 15 
Total 6 7 5 27 45 
 
Multiple parties were involved generally in 30 of the 45 settlements (66.7%) but constituted 27 of 
the 33 follow-on cases (81.8%) as evidenced by Table 22, indicating that the follow-on procedure is 
more likely to involve multiple claimants and/or defendants, and this further develops our 
understanding of the types of follow-on and stand-alone claim settlements. 
 
Table 22 Parties Involved/Type of Claim 
 
 Type of Claim 
Total Follow-on Stand-alone 
Parties involved Multiple claimants 2 0 2 
Multiple defendants 6 1 7 
Both 19 2 21 
Neither 6 9 15 
Total 33 12 45 
 
 
26 
 
Prior Proceedings Raised 
In crosstabulating the data on whether prior proceedings were raised and the damages paid, as set 
out in Table 23, although damages were paid in settlement in a number of cases where prior 
proceedings had not been raised,
86
 four of the five settlements in excess of £5m involved cases 
where litigation had been raised (80%, where prior proceedings where raised in 66.7% of cases) .  
 
Table 23 Proceedings Raised/Damages Paid 
 
 
Damages Paid 
Total 
Between £100k 
and £1m 
Between £1m 
and £5m Over £5m N/A 
Prior Proceedings Raised Yes 2 5 4 19 30 
No 4 2 1 8 15 
Total 6 7 5 27 45 
 
Despite the limitations in the data, crosstabulating the data provides some fascinating insights and 
this is notable with the crosstabulation between prior proceedings raised and whether mediation 
was involved. Table 24 demonstrates that all 5 cases involving mediation followed the instigation of 
legal proceedings- ie mediation appears not to be a complete alternative to litigation but flowed 
from and took place within the overall mechanism of litigation between the parties. 
 
Table 24 Proceedings Raised/Mediation Involved 
  
 
Mediation Involved 
Total Yes No 
Prior Proceedings Raised Yes 5 25 30 
No 0 15 15 
Total 5 40 45 
 
Basis of Settlement 
Furthermore, the crosstabulation between the basis of settlement and the type of claim (Table 25) 
shows that all 15 settlements involving payment in lieu of damages were follow-on cases.  
Table 25 basis of Settlement/Type of Claim 
 Type of Claim 
Total Follow-on Stand-alone 
Basis of Settlement Payment in lieu of damages 21 0 21 
Agreement as to future 
conduct 
3 4 7 
A combination of both 8 3 11 
Simple withdrawal of claim 1 5 6 
Total 33 12 45 
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 7, in fact 46.7% of cases where no proceedings had been raised. 
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Of course, follow-on cases, as discussed above, are not necessarily damages-only follow on 
mechanism cases before the CAT but this category also includes certain disputes before the High 
Court
87
 as demonstrated by the three cases resolved by an agreement as to future conduct. 
However the data does clearly indicate that payment in lieu settlements arise in follow-on actions 
and that stand-alone cases tend to result in agreement as to future conduct.
88
  
 
Table 26 Basis of Settlement/Mediation Involved 
 
 
 
Mediation Involved 
Total Yes No 
Basis of Settlement Payment in lieu of damages 2 19 21 
Agreement as to future 
conduct 
0 7 7 
A combination of both 3 8 11 
Simple withdrawal of claim 0 6 6 
Total 5 40 45 
 
Table 26 sets out the Basis of Settlement/Mediation involved crosstabulation. Interestingly 
mediation was always involved in the payment in lieu cases.
89
 One may have envisaged that 
mediation would more likely involve disputes concerning parties negotiating in relation to future 
behaviour in a stand-alone claim. However, in the context of competition law disputes, at least in 
these five reported settlements, mediation appears to have arisen in cartel multi-party payment 
cases, following litigation being raised, and mediation has been utilised essentially as an alternative 
mechanism for agreeing on an appropriate quantum of damages for the settlement. 
 
 
Damages Paid/Sought 
 
As demonstrated by Table 27 the settlements in follow-on cases were spread among the different 
levels of amount sought in the settlements,
90
 although the vast majority (14 of 21, 66.7%) sought 
sums of over £5m. Interestingly the stand-alone claims  for damages, predominantly abuse claims, 
were all for bigger sums:-4 for between £5 and £20m and 1 for more than £20m.  
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 And potentially the Court of Session in Scotland. 
88
 There were also 3 stand-alone cases involving a combination with payment in lieu of damages. 
89
 Payment in lieu of damages only in 2 cases and combined with an agreement as to future conduct 
in 3 cases. and with an agreement as to future conduct 
90
 Taking into account the limitations in the data here, as discussed above, as a result of a significant 
number of NA responses for damages sought and damages paid as a result of confidentiality 
concerns by respondents.  
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Table 27 Damages Sought/Type of Claim 
 
 
 
Type of Claim 
Total Follow-on Stand-alone 
Amount sought Under £1m 1 0 1 
Between £1m and £5m 6 0 6 
Between £5m and £20m 10 4 14 
Over £20m 4 1 5 
N/A 12 7 19 
Total 33 12 45 
 
Nonetheless, as the crosstabulation between damages paid and type of claim reveals in Table 28,
91
 
only 1 reported stand-alone claim settled for a payment and it was for between £1m and £5m. The 
remainder of the damages paid settlements (17 in total) were in follow-on actions, including 5 
settlements of over £5m.
92
 
 
Table 28 Damages Paid/Type of Claim 
 
 
 
Type of Claim 
Total Follow-on Stand-alone 
Damages Paid Between £100k and £1m 6 0 6 
Between £1m and £5m 6 1 7 
Over £5m 5 0 5 
N/A 16 11 27 
Total 33 12 45 
 
The picture of the mediation context is further illuminated by the evidence in Table 29 that 3 of the 
5 settlements involving claims of more than £20m resulted from mediation- 60% when mediation 
was only involved in only 11.1% of cases overall. Ignoring the N/A response in 1 mediation case, the 
outcomes were damages of between £1m and £5m in 1 case and above £5m in the remaining 3 
mediation settled cases as evidenced by Table 30. 
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 Ibid. 
92
 And it is anticipated that among the many N/A responses to this question there would have been a 
number of cases involving significant damages payments.  
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Table 29 Damages Sought/Mediation involved 
 
 Mediation Involved 
Total Yes No 
Amount sought Under £1m 0 1 1 
Between £1m and £5m 0 6 6 
Between £5m and £20m 1 16 14 
Over £20m 3 2 5 
N/A 1 18 19 
Total 5 40 45 
 
 
Table 30 Damages Paid/Mediation involved 
 
 
 
Mediation Involved 
Total Yes No 
Damages Paid Between £100k and £1m 0 6 6 
Between £1m and £5m 1 6 7 
Over £5m 3 2 5 
N/A 1 26 27 
Total 5 40 45 
 
Mediation 
There have clearly been a limited number of mediated case settlement outcomes but it presents an 
interesting pattern- cases where considerable sums have been sought, and the settlement consists 
at least partly of payment in lieu following proceedings being raised in court- though it is of course 
uncertain, based on the limited sample, whether and to what extent this is fully reflective of 
practice.   Table 31 also suggests that mediation is more likely to take place in the follow-on litigation 
environment with 4 of 5 mediated outcomes in that context. 
 
Table 31 Type of Claim/Mediation involved 
 
 
 
Mediation Involved 
Total Yes No 
Type of Claim Follow-on 4 29 33 
Stand-alone 1 11 12 
Total 5 40 45 
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Conclusions 
This research project has provided valuable additional empirical data and information about 
competition litigation and settlement outcomes in the UK. It is far from comprehensive both 
in terms of the response rate by practitioners and the nature of the data provided by some 
respondents, particularly in relation to the levels of damages sought and paid in a number of 
reported settlements. Nonetheless, in contrast with the United States where antitrust 
settlements tend to be court-approved and visible, when there is an ongoing policy debate at 
the UK and EU levels about further encouraging and facilitating competition litigation, it is 
LPSRUWDQWWRVHHNWRJDLQDEHWWHUXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHµKLGGHQ¶VWRU\RIFRPSHWLWLRQOLWLJDWLRQ
settlements in the UK, at least. There has been research to outline and review the competition 
litigation case-law and judgments in the UK, and there is increasing case-law in the High 
Court and CAT in recent years, but it is evident from anecdotal evidence that settled 
outcomes remain prevalent. This article has helped to provide at least a partial narrative of the 
types of competition litigation settlements in the UK between 2008-2012. A number of 
patterns have emerged from the research:- competition litigation settlements have 
predominately taken place in relation to Article 101 and written responses regarding the 
nature of the parties involved has inevitably demonstrated that all competition litigation 
settlements have taken place in a B2B context- the majority of which have been cartel direct 
purchaser claims. Follow-on anti-competitive agreements claims involving multiple parties 
have predominated, and these have tended to result in payments in lieu of damages. A small 
minority of primarily abuse-based claims led generally to settlements based on an agreement 
as to future conduct. The level of damages settlements in this period has generally increased 
since 2005-2008, although the data is patchy here. As with the earlier research the primary 
motivations for settlements were the uncertainty of litigation and to avoid costs and 
inconvenience and similarly the main hurdles in pursuing a competition case were perceived 
to be evidential and economic difficulties. It is unclear to what extent this picture of 
competition litigation and its settled outcomes will evolve in response to case-law 
GHYHORSPHQWVVXFKDVWKH&$7¶VFRQVLGHUDWLRQRIFDXVDWLRQLQ2 Travel Group, and the wider 
legislative and institutional developments, notably the Consumer Rights Act 2015 Schedule 
8. In particular, it will be interesting to ascertain whether consumer claims will become more 
prevalent, although these may indeed lead to CAT-approved visible Collective Settlements 
under the revised s49A and s49B of the Competition Act 1998. Finally, the research sought to 
consider the extent to which we could observe a greater prominence for mediation leading to 
competition law settlements. The data evidences a small but significant role for mediation in 
this context, particularly in relation to large cartel-based claims involving multiple claimants 
(and defendants) in follow-on claims where proceedings have already been raised, seeking 
significant damages awards leading to payment in lieu of damages. In the light of academic 
and civil justice policy support for increased resort to mediation in commercial disputes, it 
will be interesting to follow the development of mediated competition litigation settlement 
outcomes in the next few years when it is anticipated that competition litigation is likely to 
increase in the UK as a result of greater awareness and the recent reform of legal and 
institutional mechanisms for competition law private enforcement.   
